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ABSTRACT 
Though scholars recognize that peer-based risks for offending are especially robust, a 
handful of researchers have started to question whether the vulnerability to these risks 
varies across people in theoretically meaningful ways. For instance, drawing on 
theory and empirical research, there is reason to suspect that individuals of high and 
low morality are not vulnerable to deviant peer reinforcement, whereas those who 
exist in the "middle ground" of morality are.  In this way, there may be an inverted 
“U” of susceptibility to deviant peer socialization according to the level of subjects’ 
propensity for offending.  The current study investigates this hypot esis using 
longitudinal data from the National Youth Survey. Peer reinforcement does not 
significantly influence the offending behavior of the high morality individuals, and is 
a consistent and significant predictor for medium morality offenders. For low 
morality offenders, however, the results are inconsistent across the models. The 
theoretical and methodological implications for future research on the peer-propensity 







ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PEERS AND PROPENSITY: EXAMINI G 












Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the  
University of Maryland, College Park, in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 











 Professor Jean McGloin, Chair 
 Professor Raymond Paternoster 
























© Copyright by 

















I would like to thank Ray Paternoster and Terence Thornberry for their thoughtful 
and critical comments on this thesis. Jean McGloin deserves special thanks for her 
unrelenting support on this manuscript and in my graduate career, more generally. 
Her mentorship alone has helped me grow immensely as a scholar. Finally, I would 
like to thank my mom, dad, brother and sister for always being there, even after I 




Table of Contents 
 
 
Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................... ii 
Table of Contents ......................................................................................................... iii 
List of Tables ............................................................................................................... iv 
Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................. 1 
Chapter 2: Theoretical Rationale .................................................................................. 5 
Peer Reinforcement and Antisocial Behavior ........................................................... 5 
Peer Reinforcement and Propensity: Should Reinforcement Matter for Everyone? 8 
Peer Reinforcement and Morality ........................................................................... 12 
Chapter 3: Data and Methods ..................................................................................... 17 
Dependent Variable ................................................................................................ 18 
Deviance ............................................................................................................. 18 
Independent Variable .............................................................................................. 19 
Peer Reinforcement ............................................................................................. 19 
Moderating Variable ............................................................................................... 21 
Morality............................................................................................................... 21 
Control Variables .................................................................................................... 22 
Analytic Plan ........................................................................................................... 23 
Statistical Models ................................................................................................ 26 
Chapter 4: Results ....................................................................................................... 27 
Chapter 5:  Discussion and Conclusion ...................................................................... 32 
Appendices .................................................................................................................. 40 














List of Tables 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in Analysis……………………...20 
Table 2: Morality Distribution for Analytic Sample……………………………....25 
Table 3: Negative Binomial. Lagged effects of peer reinforcement co ditional on morality 
(1977-1978)………………………………………………………………………….……27 







Chapter 1: Introduction 
Delinquent peer associations consistently emerge as one of the stronge  a d most 
robust correlates of antisocial behavior, particularly among adolescents (Warr, 2002). 
Though some theorists have questioned whether the relationship between delinquent 
peers and offending is causal (Glueck & Glueck, 1950; Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990; 
Hirschi, 1969; Sampson & Laub, 1993), empirical work has found that delinquent peers 
continue to hold a strong influence on antisocial behavior even after controlling for 
variables that are hypothesized to render the relationship spurious (Kandel, 1978; 
Matsueda & Anderson, 1998; McGloin & Shermer, 2009; Thornberry et al., 1994). These 
studies have shown that delinquent peers, across age groups, play a pivotal and influential 
role in promoting a broad range of antisocial behaviors, including risky sexual behavior 
(Biglan et al., 1990; Romer et al., 1984), substance use (Curran, Stice & Chassin, 1997; 
Kandel, 1978), property crime (Agnew, 1991; Matsueda & Anderson, 1998), and violent 
offending (Conway & McCord, 2002; McGloin & Piquero, 2009). Moreover, peer 
relations have also been shown to account for the relationship between delinquency and 
other known correlates of offending, such as age (Warr, 1993) and gender (Heimer & 
DeCoster, 1999).  These findings have led many criminologists to conclude that 
delinquent peers are one of the most influential causes of antisocial beh vior (Warr, 
2002). 
Given what we already know about the role peers play in promoting antisocial 
behavior, it seems appropriate for researchers to begin to ask more nuanced questions 
regarding the peer-delinquency relationship. Instead of simply examining if peers play an 




theoretical insight may be gained by inquiring whether peers matter in different ways for 
different people.  For instance, individual propensity may interact with peer influence in 
meaningful ways—an idea that has been suggested by several scholars intere ted in 
deviant behavior (Moffitt, 1993; Vitaro et al., 1997; Wikstrom, 2006; Wright et al., 
2001). From this view, the relationship between peers and deviant behavior is n t 
uniform across all people, but rather is contingent on the individual’s level of antisocial 
propensity.  Some research has been conducted that tests this idea of ifferential 
vulnerability to peer influence by assessing how individual propensity interacts with a 
delinquent peers measure (McGloin & Shermer, 2009; Ousey & Wilcox, 2007; Vitaro et 
al., 1997; Vitaro et al., 2000; Wright et al., 2001); however, the research in this area 
suffers from two noteworthy problems. 
First, when examining the peer-propensity interaction, researchers have largely 
assumed the existence of a linear relationship (Haynie & Osgood, 2005; McGloin & 
Shermer, 2009; Wright et al., 2001; c.f. Hannon, DeFronzo & Prochnow, 2001; Ousey & 
Wilcox, 2007; Vitulano, Fite & Rathert, 2009). In other words, while propensity itself 
(e.g. morality, self-control) likely influences delinquency in a linear fashion (e.g., as 
morality decreases criminal offending increases), previous resea ch has indicated that the 
way it interacts with other social variables is not always linear (Nagin & Paternoster, 
1994; Paternoster & Pogarsky, 2009; Pogarsky, 2002). For instance, Pogarsky (2002) 
showed that there was an “inverted-U” of susceptibility to sanctio  threats based on 
individual propensity to offend, where individuals on the two fringes of propensity (high 
and low) were not deterrable but those in the middle-ground of propensity were. 




question whether previous research has modeled the moderating effects o  propensity in a 
way that allows us to accurately identify those most susceptible to peer influ nce.  
Second, extant research has not focused on a particular peer process when 
examining the peer-propensity relationship. To be sure, there are many different 
mechanisms by which peers can facilitate offending, which differ in theoretically 
meaningful ways. For example, peers can facilitate offending by providing offending 
opportunities (Osgood et al., 1996; Haynie & Osgood, 2005; Warr, 2002), and they can 
actively socialize individuals to offend by providing rewards, both anticipated and actual, 
for engaging in deviant behavior.1 Nevertheless, most studies examining the moderating 
effects of propensity on peers have simply included a “delinquent peers” m asure, which 
potentially confounds qualitatively distinct peer mechanisms of influe ce and clouds 
important variation. For example, whereas high propensity offenders may be most likely 
to take advantage of the deviant opportunities peers provide (Wright et al., 2001), lower 
propensity offenders may be most susceptible to normative peer influences (Moffitt, 
1993; see also McGloin & Stickle, 2011).  By simply including a “deviant peers” 
measure, the differential power of these peer processes can be lost.  
This thesis fills this void by arguing that the learning opportunities provided by 
peers—specifically, peer reinforcement—will be a risk factor for s me individuals, but 
not others. By focusing on morality as a form of individual propensity (Parsons, 1937; 
Wikstrom, 2006), it is hypothesized that high and low morality individuals are largely 
guided by their moral evaluations and will not be susceptible to the deviant reinforcement 
                                                
1 Although peer influence has typically been discussed through learning and opportunity frameworks, this 
is not exhaustive of all the ways peers can influence deviance. Warr (2002), for instance, discussed several 





peers provide. On the other hand, it is expected that peer reinforcement will predict 
delinquency for individuals with medium levels of morality, as they ar “neither strongly 
committed to crime nor unwaveringly conformist” (Nagin & Paternoster, 1994: p. 471) 
and are at the “tipping point” for delinquency involvement. Thus, it is suggested that 
there is an “inverted-U” of susceptibility to peer reinforcement based on an individual’s 
moral regard. This study uses longitudinal data from the National Youth Survey to test 
this hypothesis. In the end, this study sheds light on how vulnerability to peer 
reinforcement varies by moral evaluations, and further details the role peers play in 

















Chapter 2: Theoretical Rationale 
Peer Reinforcement and Antisocial Behavior 
Akers’ (1985, 1998) social learning theory contends that deviant behavior, like all 
human behavior, results from the socialization processes outlined by behavioral learning 
theorists (Bandura, 1977). This perspective emphasizes the “reciprocal interaction 
between cognitive, behavioral and environmental determinants” (Bandura, 1977: p. vii) 
and posits that the probability that a deviant act occurs or is repeated is dependent on the 
past, present and anticipated future rewards and punishments that result from that 
behavior. Akers offers several dimensions to his social learning theory (differential 
association, definitions, reinforcement, imitation), however, there has been a large 
emphasis (both theoretically and empirically) on the extrinsic reinforcement 
contingencies surrounding deviance (Akers, 1985; Burgess & Akers, 1966; Capaldi et al., 
1997; Patterson, 1975; Winfree et al., 1994). This reinforcement focus expects that 
human (and criminal) behavior is dependent on the perceptions individuals have about 
the consequences of their behavior. If they believe that they will be reinforced or 
rewarded for the behavior then they will likely act on it. Importantly, how an individual 
perceives the actual and anticipated consequences of their behaviors is influenced by 
previously learned experiences (direct and vicarious).  
Although Akers’ theory notes that there can be a wide range of social and 
nonsocial sources of reinforcement, much of the work assessing the effects of 
reinforcement on behavior has concentrated on peers (Dishion et al., 1996; Patterson et 
al., 2000; Regnerus, 2002; Winfree et al., 1994). This is not surprising given 




place on peers during that time period (Brown, 1990; Warr, 2002). Because adolescents 
place a strong emphasis on peer acceptance (level of popularity and ability to initiate and 
maintain friendship ties) it is hypothesized by learning theorists that they are highly 
sensitive to the normative influence of peers and to the level of (dis)approval they exhibit 
towards behaviors (Dishion et al., 1996; Warr, 2002). If an individual’s peers approve of 
the delinquent behavior that he/she engages in, then the actions are rewarded both 
externally (status accruement) and cognitively (excitement) (Akers, 1998; Moffitt, 1993; 
Patterson, 1975). Moreover, this reinforcement increases the likelihood that the 
individual will view deviant behavior as a positive option when faced with s milar 
opportunities in the future (Akers, 1985). Thus, the social learning perspective suggests 
that peers have a strong normative influence on individuals and promote delinquency by 
altering that person’s perceptions of the anticipated rewards and punishme ts associated 
with deviant behavior (see Akers, 1985; 1998). 
Warr (2002) has presented a slight variation of this perspective in asserting that 
peers influence delinquency by creating an alternative “moral universe”.  He suggests 
peer influence (i.e. reinforcement) can exempt individuals from the moral standards that 
generally regulate their behavior. In this way, peers assist in the facilitation of criminal 
acts by changing the moral code of group members that can, at times, promote antisocial 
behavior even if an individual generally holds moral inhibitions against the act. As an 
example, while an individual may generally hold strong moral reservations against 
vandalism, the positive stimuli reinforcing and promoting the behavior may dilute their 
reservations against it, and eventually, lead them to have values that are permissive or 




moral evaluations is particularly prominent during adolescence, when individuals expand 
their understanding of the relative nature of moral conduct (i.e., the idea that what is 
prohibited in one group, can be permissible, and even promoted, in another).  
Extant research on the relationship between peer reinforcement and delinquency 
has provided support for the idea that individuals are receptive to these reinforcement 
contingencies.  Akers & Lee (1996), for instance, found that peer reinforcement was a 
significant predictor of smoking behavior using a longitudinal sample of secondary 
students. Dewit and colleagues (2000) similarly found that peer approval for substance 
use predicted drug use patterns of individual respondents. Moreover, research has also 
found that friends’ reinforcement for deviant behavior is a significat predictor of both 
property and violent crime (Agnew, 1991; Capaldi et al., 2001; Dishion et al., 1996; 
Winfree, Backstrom, & Mays, 1994; see also Krohn et al., 1996; Patterson t al., 2000; 
Solomon & Wahler, 1973). These studies generally concluded not just that individuals 
are susceptible to the extrinsic mechanisms described by learning theorists, but more 
specifically that they oftentimes adjust their behavior based on what they believe will 
lead to greater peer approval. 
Despite these findings, some research has suggested that reinforcement only plays 
a small role in the influence peers have on offending. Warr and Stafford (1991), for 
instance, sought to determine whether it was peer behavior (imitation) or peer attitudes 
(measured as their friends’ approval for deviant behaviors) that are most influential in 
promoting delinquency and found that the effects of peer behavior on delinquency ar  
much larger than the effects of attitudinal transmission. In a recent meta-analysis, Pratt 




offending when compared to other components of social learning theory, such as 
differential association.2 Nevertheless, caution must be taken before outright dismissing 
peer reinforcement as a strong causal factor in offending, as most of the studies testing 
the effects have assumed uniform susceptibility to reinforcement contingencies and have 
failed to consider whether individuals with varying levels of antisocial propensity are 
differentially vulnerable to peer reinforcement. 
 
Peer Reinforcement and Propensity: Should Reinforcement Matter for Everyone? 
In her dual taxonomy, Moffitt (1993) suggests that there is differential 
susceptibility to peer reinforcement based on individual propensity. She notes that the 
causes of delinquent behavior differs between life-course persistent and adolescent-
limited offenders, with the behavior of life-course persisters (high propensity offenders) 
being largely driven by individual characteristics (i.e. neuropsychological deficits) and 
adolescent-limited (low propensity) offenders being most influenced by social factors 
such as peer associations. For Moffitt (1993), life-course persistent off nders possess an 
individual proclivity for offending and do not require social influences ( .g., peer 
learning, pressure) to engage in delinquent behavior. These individuals may offend with 
peers, but do not offend because of them, as their poor executive functioning predisposes 
them to antisocial behavior regardless of the reinforcement provided by peers (see also 
McGloin & Stickle, 2011).  
In contrast, Moffitt (1993) believes peers have strong influence over individuals 
with lower levels of antisocial propensity (adolescent-limited), who imitate, and are 
                                                
2 Although differential association is a specific component of Akers’ social learning theory, it incorpates 
nearly all of the different mechanisms of peer influence, including opportunities, modeling, reinforcement 




subsequently reinforced for, delinquent behavior in their attempt to fill the “maturation 
gap” present during adolescence (Moffitt, 1993; see also Nagin & Paternoster, 1994). She 
is explicit that it is learning mechanisms, such as modeling and reinforcement, that 
influence the offending behavior of adolescent-limited (AL) offenders.  Given that the 
offending behavior of adolescent-limited offenders lacks stability and cross-situational 
continuity, it is likely determined by reinforcement contingencies that, at the time, 
promote or disapprove of engaging in deviance. From this view, the learning mechanisms 
provided by delinquent peers have their strongest effect on nonchronic offenders, who, 
unlike their high propensity counterparts, maintain control over their antisocial responses 
and show flexibility in their offending behavior (Moffitt, 1993: p. 686; see also McGloin 
& Stickle, 2011).  
Whereas Moffitt’s theory views antisocial propensity as categorical, others view 
propensity as existing on a continuum (Gottfredson & Hirschi. 1990; Wilson & 
Hernstein, 1985). From this latter view, individuals are not simply categorized as being 
either high or low in antisocial propensity, but rather are continuously ordered on a 
spectrum of criminal proclivity that allows for much more variation when classifying an 
individual’s risk for offending. If criminal propensity acts on a continuum, there would 
be meaningful differences across individuals within the high/low propensity groups that 
researchers use to categorize individuals. For instance, whereas some individuals 
categorized as high propensity may be particularly crime prone, thers may actually 
possess more moderate levels of propensity. Thus, while these individuals are similarly 
described as having high criminal propensity, their individual criminal proclivity, and in 




If one considers propensity from this view, it is reasonable to suspect that the 
relationship between peers and propensity may be more complicated than a simple 
high/low propensity dichotomy. To be clear, whereas high propensity offenders are not 
vulnerable to peer reinforcement because their individual characteristi s place them at a 
high risk of offending regardless of peer influence, it may be that low propensity 
offenders are so disinclined to offend that they are similarly unresponsive to these 
reinforcement contingencies. This view suggests that for some individuals social factors 
are either not necessary (in the case of high propensity offenders) or insufficient (for low 
propensity offenders) to overcome individual characteristics. These individuals would be 
largely guided by their propensity to offend, and would not be vulnerable to the social 
risk factors that influences an individual’s decision to offend. Low propensity offenders 
would not even consider how their peers would react to the offending because they 
conform to social norms under all situations. Meanwhile, high propensity offenders hold 
such a high proclivity towards offending that they place little to no weight on these social 
consequences when faced with the opportunity to engage in a deviant act.  Other 
individuals, however, possess more moderate levels of propensity and are at a “tipping 
point” for offending that makes them particularly susceptible to social stimuli. Thus, 
certain social influences may only be influential for the offending behavior of individuals 
in the “middle ground” of antisocial propensity.  
Though the idea this “tipping point” hypothesis has not been tested wi h regard to 
peer influence, deterrence scholars have suggested a similar relationship when discussing 
how formal sanctions interact with antisocial propensity. Specifically, this research 




susceptible to the threat of sanctions than are those in the middle of the propensity 
distribution, who are neither “strongly committed to crime nor unwaveringly 
conforming” (Nagin & Paternoster, 1994, p. 471). For instance, Pogarsky (2002) 
discussed three types of offenders when assessing susceptibility to formal sanctions: 
acute conformists, deterrable and incorrigible. He hypothesized that acute conformists 
and incorrigible individuals would largely be guided by individual characte istics such as 
self- and social (dis)approval to drunk driving, and that the middle-propensity offenders 
(deterrable) would be most susceptible to formal sanctions. Pogarsky (2002) found 
support for his hypothesis—specifically, that formal punishments were in ffectual for 
acute conformists and incorrigible individuals and, accordingly, the interaction between 
deterrence and individual propensity forms an “inverted-U” rather than a linear 
relationship.  
These studies contribute considerably to our understanding of the interaction 
between social influences of crime and individual propensity. Given the commonalities 
between formal punishments and reinforcement (both are stimuli working to modify an 
individual’s behavior), one might predict that peer reinforcement interacts with 
propensity in a way similar to formal sanctions. This may be particularly true when 
considering how peer reinforcement can remove moral restraints against crime—an 
individual characteristic that has been discussed in the past by theoris s interested in 
explaining peer influence on offending, but has been largely neglected in the empirical 




Peer Reinforcement and Morality 
Morality is an individual-level construct at the foundation of criminal propensity 
(Felson, 1993; Trasler, 1993), and Parsons has even gone as far as to define criminal 
propensity as an absence of an “internal moral sense” (1937: 40; see also Mears et al., 
1998; Hannon et al., 1999; Piquero et al., 2005). Antonaccio and Tittle (2008) found that 
low morality is a general predictor of misconduct when controlling for other individual 
characteristics associated with deviant behavior (e.g. self-control). Studies have also 
indicated that high morality can act as a buffer against the negativ  effects of other 
criminogenic risk factors, such as self-control and lack of formal sanctions (Paternoster & 
Simpson, 1996; Schoepfer & Piquero, 2006). Taken together, these findings provide 
empirical justification for using a measure of individual morality to assess the 
relationship individual propensity and social influences of crime, as well as to examine 
these interacting effects extending beyond a simple two group dichotomy. Indeed, many 
scholars have called for inquiries to carefully assess the way in which morality interacts 
with other risk factors for offending (Antonaccio & Tittle, 2008; Bachman et al., 1992; 
Paternoster & Simpson, 1996; Wikstrom, 2005), and it may be of particular theo etical 
interest assess this using peer reinforcement given the claims of some criminologists that 
peers promote offending by removing moral restraints against deviance. 
Recall that Warr (2002) incorporated morality into the peer-delinquency 
relationship in suggesting that socializing in peer groups influences an individual’s 
offending behavior by “exempting them, if only momentarily, from the moral code” that 
governs and controls their behavior outside of the group (2002: 65; see also Grnovetter, 




behavior can be sidestepped when the reinforcement that delinquent peers provide for the 
antisocial behavior encourages them to skirt their moral reservations against crime. In 
some instances, this normative influence can lead social groups to crea e their own moral 
climate that is supportive of—or at least permissive to—antisocial behavior. 
Matza (1964; see also Sykes & Matza, 1957) offers a similar explanation on the 
role peers play in promoting criminal behavior. In response to many subcultural theories 
of crime suggesting that offenders hold norms counter to those of middle-class society, 
Matza argued that delinquents almost always hold the same moral standards as those 
present in the conventional social order, and instead “drift” between conventional and 
criminal behavior. Given that criminal behavior is generally against the individual’s 
moral code the process of drifting into deviance requires individual neutralizations or 
social influences that allow for the person to bypass his/her moral reservations. Similar to 
Warr (2002), Matza (1964) believes that the peer group plays a vital role in the drifting 
process due to the pressure individuals feel to achieve group acceptance. 
If peers do affect behavior by removing an individual’s moral restraints against 
crime, the strength of this peer effect should logically vary based on the individual’s own 
level of morality. Specifically, peers should be most influential for those individuals who 
would need or are able to “sidestep” their moral codes in order to offend. From this 
perspective, high propensity offenders are not susceptible to the learning and 
reinforcement mechanisms that peers provide as their low levels of morality serve as a 
saturated risk for delinquency (see also McGloin & Stickle, 2011); these individuals do 




peer reinforcement to drift into delinquency, for they are in constant hold of pro- (or 
permissive) delinquent values and have nothing to drift into. 
It might therefore seem that lower risk individuals (i.e., those with higher levels of 
morality) are most susceptible to peer reinforcement. Those with hig er levels of 
morality, by definition, hold anti-delinquent values and would require peer reinforcement 
to drift into delinquency and exempt them from their moral code (Matza, 1964; Warr, 
2002). Given the extant research on the dynamics of morality and crime (Hannon et al., 
2001; Mears et al., 1998), however, this may not be an appropriate assumption.  It is 
possible that, while many are vulnerable to peer reinforcement and able to drift into 
delinquency, some individuals hold such strong moral reservations against crime that 
they are protected against the influence of peer reinforcement promoting offe ding. 
Indeed, several studies have indicated that high morality protects against the 
adverse effects of criminogenic risk factors. Some of these studie  have even shown that 
high moral evaluations protect against delinquent peer influence on various antisocial 
outcomes ranging in seriousness (Hannon et al., 2001; Mears et al., 1998) This raises the 
idea that individuals with high levels of morality hold such strong levels of anti-
delinquent codes that they would not offend no matter the level of reinforcement being 
offered by peers. Thus, both individuals with high and low levels of morality may not be 
vulnerable to the reinforcement contingencies provided by peers, as both are guided by 
their moral beliefs (or lack of) regardless of the reinforcement offered by peers. 
Individuals low in morality, as discussed above, are already holding values conducive to 





In this way, individuals with medium levels of moral regard may be the only ones 
susceptible to peer reinforcement. These individuals may not only recognize the relative 
nature of moral codes, but also be the ones who are most likely to “drif ” (Matza, 1964; 
Warr, 2002). Individuals in the middle-ground of moral regard may be at a “tipping 
point” of delinquency and conformist behavior, where social influences such as peer 
reinforcement can push them into delinquency. Thus, their willingness to engage in 
deviant behavior is contingent on the normative approval offered by delinquent peers. Put 
differently, persons in the middle-ground of morality may refrain from deviant behavior 
under most circumstances because they generally hold values that disapprove of 
antisocial behavior; however, the pressure to conform and fit in with peers may result in 
vulnerability to the anticipated social rewards offered by peers for antisocial behavior.  
Granovetter (1978) has offered a similar hypothesis when discussing one’s 
susceptibility to collective behavior—specifically, rioting. He suggests that people are 
rational beings seeking to maximize their utility; however, different individuals vary in 
the benefits that they receive from rioting. Specifically, some “radical” individuals have 
such a low utility threshold that they require no influence from a collective group before 
joining a riot, and would engage in the behavior even if no one else did as long as the 
opportunity presented itself. On the other side, some individuals have such ahig  utility 
threshold that they would not join a riot under any circumstances, as they perceive the 
benefits of rioting as small and the costs as exceptionally high. Accordingly, Granovetter 
(1978) suggests that it is people towards the middle of the utility threshold distribution 
who are most susceptible to social influences promoting rioting—their reshold for 




(or lack thereof) against the behavior.  Although Granovetter’s thesis doe  not directly 
address the role delinquent peers play in promoting antisocial behavior, it does share 
several similarities with the hypothesis presented here. Rioting can be seen as a form of 
antisocial behavior and like, deviance, Granovetter notes that it is greatly impacted by the 
influence of the group. Moreover, one’s susceptibility to the group is conditied by 
individual characteristics such that individuals on the fringes of the u ility threshold are 
guided largely by their individual characteristics and individuals in the middle are highly 
influenced by the collective group. In the same way, individual who are high in morality 
or low in morality may be largely guided by their moral regard, whereas those in the 
middle ground may best most influenced by the normative influence of d linquent peers.   
 Although no research has explicitly assessed the functional formby which 
morality moderates peer reinforcement, it is possible that the relationship between peer 
reinforcement and morality forms an inverted-U, similar to what is hypothesized by 
Granovetter (1978). To review, Matza (1964) and Warr (2002) have both suggested p ers 
facilitate behavior by removing moral restraints and allowing individuals to “drift into 
delinquency”. However, it is reasonable to suspect that certain individuals have such high 
levels of moral regard that no amount of reinforcement can cause them to drift into 
deviance, while others are so low in morality that they will offend regardless of whether 
peers reinforce them or not. Accordingly, this study tests the hypot esis that individuals 
with medium levels of morality are susceptible to peer reinforcement, whereas those of 




Chapter 3: Data and Methods 
This study uses three waves of data from the National Youth Survey (1977, 1978, 
& 1979), a longitudinal survey of delinquency and drug use conducted in the continental 
United States. The survey is based on a national probability sample of 1,725 individuals 
aged 12-20 (they capture the time in social development at which peers are thought to be 
at their peak of influence).3 There was some sample attrition as respondents moved 
throughout the study; however, Elliott et al. (1985) found that the representativ ness of 
the survey was not seriously affected by the loss. At each wave of the survey, 
respondents were asked extensive questions about their moral beliefs and delinquent peer 
associations at the time of the interview, as well as the frequency and rate of delinquent 
behavior that occurred in the previous calendar year. Data derived fom the National 
Youth Survey have been used extensively in the past to assess both the effects of peers 
and morality on deviant behavior (Agnew, 1992; Elliott et al., 1985; Hannon et al., 2001; 
Matsueda & Anderson, 1998; Mears et al., 1998). 
A few of the behaviors used in constructing the measures lose meaning for the 
older respondents as they age during the three years used in this study. For instance, 
cheating on school exams (as well GPA as a control variable) may no longer apply to 
those who complete their high school education and getting drunk, although illeal, 
becomes relatively normalized for individuals transitioning from adolescence into 
adulthood. In order to assess the dynamic relationship between peer reinforcement, 
                                                
3 These waves were selected for analysis for three pimary reasons. First, a large portion of the sample did 
not provide responses to the survey questions regarding deviance in the 1977 wave, which would limit 
statistical power if testing a 19761977 lagged model. Second, some of the variables usd in the analysis 
were coded differently in the 1976 wave which would re uce the consistency across all of the models. 
Finally, unlike the later waves in the NYS, the waves used here capture respondents at a time when peers 
are thought to be most salient (adolescence), and where many of the behaviors used to create the 




morality and delinquency during adolescence, the sample is restrict d to individuals who 
remain juveniles through the 1979 wave. Thus, individuals who are 16 years or older in 
the 1977 wave are excluded from the analyses. After this deletion, 1,036 of the original 
1,725 cases remain.4  
Dependent Variable 
Deviance 
The dependent variable for this study is a summed measure of 16 items assessing 
the number of times a respondent engaged in various deviant behaviors in the previous 
calendar year.5 The offenses in the deviance scale ranged in severity and covered 
behaviors such as cheating on exams, damaging property, stealing, and hitting another 
person.6 Descriptive statistics for each of the offenses used in the composite deviance 
measure for the 1978 and 1979 waves are presented in Appendix 1 and 2, respectively. 
Again, these deviance measures were summed, however, the data were highly skewed 
with a high proportion of zeros and a maximum of 697 offenses in the 1978 wave and 
1008 offenses in the 1979 wave. Accordingly, in both waves the deviance outcomes are 
top-coded at the 90th percentile. This corresponds to 22 offenses in 1978 and 23 offenses 
in 1979.  Descriptive statistics presented in Table 1 indicate that an verage respondent 
committed 5.44 deviant acts in the 1978 wave. Comparing the mean and standard 
                                                
4 The deleted individuals differ from the final sample in a few ways other than age. Subjects in the final 
sample are more likely to be non-white, report greater family attachment and parental influence, report 
higher levels of morality, experience less deviant reinforcement from peers, and report fewer deviant 
behaviors when compared to the older respondents who were removed from the sample.  
5 The dependent variable sums 16 items because NYS has separate questions into the number of times a 
respondent vandalized family property, school propety, and other property instead of containing a general 
vandalism item as there is for the reinforcement and morality measures. Similarly, respondents were also 
asked how many times they hit a parent, teacher or other individuals in separate items.  
6 The alpha on the 16 measures was relatively low (α = .51). Nevertheless, for conceptual clarity, the 








Akers (1985; 1998) contends that humans are sensitive to reinforcement 
contingencies and that peer reinforcement for deviance (both anticip ted and actual) 
plays a key role in learning antisocial behavior. However, he notes that the effects of 
these normative influences can only be meaningful if the individual perceiv s that his 
peers approve of or would approve of the antisocial behavior. In the sam w y, peer 
reinforcement can only remove one’s moral restraint against crime if that individual is 
aware of their friends’ approval for the act. Accordingly, this study uses perceptual 
measures of peer reinforcement to examine whether perceived peer approval for deviance 
is moderated by morality in theoretically meaningful ways. 
Peer reinforcement is an average measure assessing perceived p er approval for 
eight antisocial behaviors. Individuals were asked how their friends would react if they 
engaged in behaviors including cheating, drinking, stealing, vandalism and assault. 
Responses to each item were on a scale of 1 (strongly approve), 2 (approve), 3 (neither), 
4 (disapprove), 5 (strongly disapprove). Each item was reverse cod d so that higher 
                                                
7 As a supplementary analysis, the dependent variable of interest was also be operationalized as a variety 
score in order to test the robustness of the findings (i.e., each of the deviance items will be dichotomized as 
0/1+, and then summed; see Appendices 3 and 4). The results of these models are inconsistent for the low 
morality group. In the 19771978 models, peer reinforcement is not significantly related to the deviance 
variety score, with an effect size that is almost half of the size of the medium morality group. In the 
19781979, however, peer reinforcement is a significant predictor of the deviance variety score for the 
low morality groups and the effect size is comparable to the effect size of the medium morality indiviuals. 
The results are consistent and in accordance with the primary models for the medium and high morality 
groups, however. Peer reinforcement is a significant predictor of the deviant behavior of the medium 





values indicate stronger peer approval for deviance. (α = .84).  After summing all items, 
this was then divided by eight to return the values to a four-point scale. The mean peer 
reinforcement score of 2.60 (S.D. = .573) indicates that most respondents report that their 
peers would disapprove of deviant behavior (see Table 1). 
 




n Mean S. D. Min Max 
Deviance      
1978 
 
977 5.439 7.186 0 22 
1979 
 





     
1977 
 
979 2.600 .573 1.625 4.750 
1978 
 
969 2.798 .574 1.750 5 
Morality      
1977 
 
995 3.517 .421 1 4 
1978 
 
979 3.411 .456 1.375 4 
Family 
Attachment 
     
1977 
 
995 4.287 .856 1 5 




     
        1977 
 
987 4.194 .951 1 5 
1978 
 
973 3.979 1.051 1 5 
GPA      
1977 995 3.726 .816 1 5 
 





Age      
1977 1036 13.514 1.115 12 15 
 
1978 1036 14.514 1.115 13 16 
 
Urban      
1977 995 .268 
 
.443 0 1 




1036 .769 .421 0 1 






 An index of morality was constructed by averaging eight measures that assess the 
respondent’s (dis)approval for deviant behavior. The measures ask respondents how 
wrong it is for someone their age to, for example, cheat on exams, damage property, 
steal, or hit someone without reason. The eight items ask about the same behavior 
covered in the peer reinforcement measure.  Each item is on a scale of 1 (not wrong at 
all), 2 (a little bit wrong), 3 (wrong), and 4 (very wrong). Higher values on the scale 
indicate stronger disapproval towards deviant behavior, and thus, indicate that individuals 
possess higher moral regard (α = .89). Descriptive statistics indicate a mean morality 
score of 3.52 (S.D. = .421), suggesting that most respondents report strong moral 
reservations against deviant behavior.8 
                                                
8 A negative binomial regression analysis indicates that morality is a significant predictor of offendig in 





 Hirschi (1969) and other control theorists (Sampson & Laub, 1993) contend that 
the relationship between peers and delinquency is spurious, and propose that the root 
cause of delinquency lies in an individual’s attachment to institutions of informal social 
control, such as the family and school. From this view, social relationships remain a 
proximate cause of deviant behavior; however, the causal role of peer influence is 
discounted because associating with delinquent peers is an outcome of poor social bonds 
along with delinquency, and not a cause of delinquency itself. In order to appropriately 
assess the causal role of peer reinforcement on delinquency, bonds to family and school 
are controlled for in the statistical models. 
 Two measures tap into the respondent’s attachment to parents/family. At each 
wave of the survey respondents were asked “How important are the things hat you have 
done with your family been to you?”, with responses ranging on a five-point scale from 
(1) not important, (2) not too important, (3) somewhat important, (4) pretty important and 
(5) very important. Further, respondents were asked “How much have your parents 
influenced what you have thought or done?” Again, responses range on a five-point scale 
from (1) very little, (2) not much, (3) some, (4) quite a bit, (5) a great deal. These items 
have been used in prior studies examining the relationship between family attachment 
and crime (Fagan & Wexler, 1987; Simons et al., 1991; see also Hirschi, 1969; Sampson 
& Laub, 1993). Table 1 indicates mean scores of 4.29 (S.D. = .903) and 4.19 (S.D. = 
.851) for importance of family activities and parental influence, respectively. 
 A measure of grade point average (GPA) is used to assess each r spondent’s 




mostly F’s, (2) mostly D’s, (3) mostly C’s, (4) mostly B’s or (5) mostly A’s. 
Accordingly, higher values indicate greater academic achievemnt and, in turn, more 
commitment to school (Hirschi, 1969). Descriptive statistics indicate that the mean score 
on this five-point scale is 3.73 (S.E. = .816), suggesting that respondents generally report 
having C to B grade point averages.  
 Although demographic characteristics are not direct causes of antisocial behavior, 
they can be markers of other causal processes influential in deviancy (Wikstrom, 2006). 
Age, race, gender and urbanicity, for instance, can be indicative of biol gical or social 
characteristics influencing peer selection, moral beliefs and/or delinquent behavior. Age 
is a continuous variable ranging from 12 to 15 years of age in the 1977 wave. Race is a 
dichotomous variable where a value of 1 indicates the respondent is white, and a value of 
0 indicates he or she is of another race.  Gender is coded as male=1 and female=0. 
Finally, urbanicity is a geographical code where a value of 1 indicates the respondent 
lives in an urban area and a value of 0 suggests he or she lives in a suburban or rural area. 
The data suggest that most of the respondents are, on average, 13 years of age, white 
(77%), male (52%), and live outside urban areas (27%) in the 1977 wave.9  
Analytic Plan 
In order to accurately test the hypothesis that peer reinforcement is most 
influential for individuals with medium levels of morality, the morality measure must be 
separated into three categories: high morals, medium morals, and low morals. A high 
morality individual is conceptualized as someone who consistently holds strong moral 
beliefs against antisocial behavior, and thus, is operationalized in this study as individuals 
                                                




who viewed all delinquent acts as “very wrong” (i.e., had a mean morality score of 4). 
Conversely, a person of low morals is viewed as someone who generally does not 
disapprove of delinquent acts. Individuals who possess an average morality score less 
than 3 may generally approve of antisocial behavior (i.e., with the scale used to capture 
moral beliefs, any value below 3 indicates that they approve of the delinquent behavior). 
However, on average they only approve of one of the eight deviant behaviors used in 
constructing the morality measure. Thus, using a cut-point of less than three may include 
a number of individuals who are not truly reporting low levels of morality. In order to 
more accurately identify these individuals, the low morality group is restricted to a more 
conservative average morality score of 2.75 or less. This more restrictive measure is used 
for several reasons. First, value of 2.75 is approximately two standard deviations below 
the morality mean. Second, restricting the sample to 2.75 requires that the individuals 
approve of at least two of the eight (25%) deviant behaviors used to create th  morality 
measure. Taken together, the more conservative cut-point of 2.75 may better capture the 
low moral individuals who are of theoretical interest in this study.  Therefore, individuals 
who possess average morality scores greater than 2.75 but less than 4 are categorized as 
possessing medium levels of morality.  
 It is noteworthy that several scholars have suggested that the relationship between 
peers, morality, and delinquent behavior is much more dynamic than is being tested in 
this paper. Thornberry (1987), for instance, argues that these relationships are reciprocal, 
where morality can condition the effects of peers on delinquency, but peers also play an 
influential role in changing one’s moral beliefs. Moreover, one’s peerassociations can 




on one’s peer associations. Indeed, such a dynamic relationship is likely g v n the 
complexity of human behavior. Nonetheless, for empirical clarity the models presented in 
this paper will only test the lagged effects of peer reinforcement on deviance, conditional 
on morality, and will not examine the dynamic effects proposed by Thornberry (1987) 
and others.  
Table 2. Morality Distributions for Analytic Sample. 
 











Total n = 942 
145 
 









High Morals 109 
 
Total n = 811* 
 
* The reduction in sample size is a result of non-responses in 
the model variables. 
 
Frequencies indicate that 51 and 152 individuals are categorized as having low 
and high morals in 1977, respectively. Again, it is expected that these two groups will be 
guided by their moral evaluations and will not be susceptible to peer reinforcement 
contingencies that promote deviance. Instead, it is those with medium levels of morality 
that will be susceptible to such influence. The data indicate that, in the 1977 wave, 746 






 Two regression models will examine whether peer reinforcement has a significant 
lagged effect on general deviant behavior, across the levels of morality (1977 items 
predicting 1978 behavior, and 1978 items predicting 1979 behavior).10 For each sets of 
models, three separate regressions will be ran: one using the sample of low moral 
individuals, one using the sample of medium morality individuals, and one usig the high 
moral sample. This will allow for the strength of the peer reinforcement effect to be 
compared across the morality categories for each of the models. Again, the purpose of 
this study is to test the hypothesis that morality moderates the effects of normative peer 
influence in meaningful ways. Specifically, the hypothesis is that hose individuals with 
medium levels of morality are susceptible to peer reinforcement, whereas high and 
immoral individuals are not susceptible to such influence. 
 As mentioned above, the dependent variable of interest in this study i  a count 
measure that depicts the number of deviant acts each respondent has egaged in for the 
1978 and 1979 waves. The count nature of the dependent variable and the overdispersion 
present in the data renders OLS and Poisson models inappropriate when estimating 
parameters. Thus, this study utilizes negative binomial regressions in each of the models, 
a statistical approach well-suited for overdispersed count data (Osgood, 2000). 
                                                
10 No cross-sectional models are run in this study due to the temporal wording of the predictors and the 
dependent variable. Respondents are asked about their attitudes towards deviant behaviors at the time of the 
survey, and the amount of delinquent behavior that engaged in the year prior to the survey. Thus, a cross-





Chapter 4: Results 
Table 3. Negative Binomial. Lagged effects of peer reinforcement conditional on morality 
(1977-1978)  
 Low Morals Med. Morals 
 
High Morals 






             .331 
            (.252) 
 
.551** 
           (.150) 
               .572 
              (.392) 
Family 
Attachment 
             .024 
            (.109) 
 
           -.128 
           (.066) 
               .617 
             (.337) 
Parental Influence              .074 
            (.100) 
 
           -.022 
           (.073) 
             -.388 
              (.277) 
GPA 
 
            -.124 
            (.119) 
 
           -.144* 
           (.066) 
              -.242 
              (.264) 
Age             -.045 
            (.133) 
 
            .038 
           (.050) 
             -.025 
             (.158) 
White              .389 
            (.257) 
 
           .437*  
          (.178) 
              .306 
            (.466) 
Male              .303  
            (.304) 
 
           .210 
          (.109) 
             .559 
            (.392) 
Urban            -.100 
           (.247) 
 
           .172 
          (.128) 
            -.185 
            (.513) 
Constant           1.620 
         (2.179) 
 
          .323 
         (.823) 
            -.921  
          (2.779) 
ln α             -.847 
           (.256) 
 
          .612 
         (.064) 
           1.275 
          (.183) 
          n = 51         n = 746            n = 145 
** p < .01.  p < .05, two-tailed.  
 
 
 The results of the 19771978 and the 1978  1979 analyses are presented in 
Tables 3 and 4, respectively.  Regarding the moderating effects of morality on peer 




accordance with the hypothesis, peer reinforcement does not have a significant effect on 
the offending behavior of high moral individuals in both models when using any 
traditional levels of significance (p > .10). Notably, however, the effect size for peer 
reinforcement is comparable to, and slightly larger than, the mediu  morality group (b = 
.572) in the 19771978 wave. In turning to the 19781979 lagged model, however, we 
see that peer reinforcement is not a significant predictor of offending for high moral 
individuals and the effect size is nearly half the size as the effect size for both the 
medium and low morality groups (b = .378, p > .10). Taken together, it appears that the 
high moral regard that these individuals possess protects them from the reinforcement 
that peers provide that promotes antisocial behavior. 
 Second, the models suggest that peer reinforcement is an inconsistent predictor of 
deviance for individuals who have low morals. In the 1977  1978 model, the effect size 
for peer reinforcement on individuals low in morality is nearly half the size of the 
medium morality group and does not reach statistical significance (b  = .331; p > .10), 
suggesting that these individuals do not require peer reinforcement to offend. In the 
19781979 model, peer reinforcement is significantly related to offending for the low 
morality group, and the effect size is comparable to the effect size for the medium 
morality group (b = .689; p < .05).  Supplemental analysis using a deviance variety score 
(which is presented in the appendix) confirmed these findings— among low morality 
individuals, peer reinforcement is not a significant predictor in the 19771978, but is a 
strong predictor in the 19781979 model. Accordingly, the findings here are 
inconclusive as to whether individuals low in morality are susceptible to the 




 Peer reinforcement is consistent and significant predictor of antisocial behavior 
for the medium morality group. In both the 19771978 (b = 551, p < .01) and 
19781979 (b = .695, p < .01) models the effect size of peer reinforcement is significat 
at the .01 level. The incident rate ratios provide some sense of thstrength of this effect. 
In the 19771978 model, when holding all other variables constant, a one-unit increase 
in peer reinforcement is associated with a 1.734 factor increase in th expected count rate 
of deviant behavior. This effect is larger in the 19781979 model (IRR = 2.000), 
suggesting that a one-unit increase in peer reinforcement is associ te with a 2.00 factor 
increase increase in the count rate of deviant behavior. Taken together, it appears that 
medium propensity offenders are consistently vulnerable to normative peer influ nce. 
 In summary, peer reinforcement has consistently significant effects on the 
offending behavior of medium morality individuals, however, has inconsistent effects for 
both the high and low morality individuals. Although the hypothesis in this s udy is that 
peer reinforcement has no effect on the offending of these latter groups, and not simply 
that it has less of an effect, I nevertheless conducted equality of coefficients tests to 
determine whether the effects of peer reinforcement were significantly different across 
the morality categories.11 The results of these tests cloud the waters even further. 
Although the effect of peer reinforcement on delinquency was half the size of the 
medium morality group in the 19771978 low morality regression and the 19781979 
high morality regression, these differences are not statistic lly significant. Accordingly, I 
                                                







cannot reject the null hypothesis that peer reinforcement has the same effect across the 
different morality groups.                                    
                                                                                                                                                                        
 




Low Morals Med. Morals 
 
High Morals 






             .689* 
            (.276) 
 
.695** 
           (.128) 
               .378 
              (.518) 
Family 
Attachment 
            -.057 
            (.118) 
 
           -.203** 
           (.092) 
             -.010 
             (.342) 
Parental Influence              .184 
            (.112) 
 
           -.002 
           (.059) 
             -.180 
              (.190) 
GPA 
 
            -.128 
            (.138) 
 
           -.101 
           (.073) 
               .075 
              (.259) 
Age              .039 
            (.237) 
 
            .010 
           (.051) 
              .128 
             (.173) 
White              .069 
            (.356) 
 
            .416**  
          (.145) 
            -.723 
            (.569) 
Male             -.182 
            (.605) 
 
           .272* 
          (.120) 
             .115 
            (.444) 
Urban            -.105 
           (.280) 
 
           .039 
          (.134) 
             .392 
            (.609) 
Constant            -.377 
         (2.514) 
 
          .257 
         (.933) 
          -1.504 
          (3.512) 
ln α              -.064 
           (.181) 
 
          .623  
         (.071) 
           1.115 
          (.234) 
          n = 85         n = 617             n = 109 





 The control variables have differential effects on antisocial behavior cross the 
different morality groups. For the high moral group, none of the variables were 
significantly related to offending in either model, potentially suggesting that high moral 
beliefs act as a strong protector against delinquency, even for those who associate with 
peers who reinforce delinquency and those who are poorly attached to insti utions of 
social control like the school and family. Other than peer reinforcement in the 
19781979 model, no variables were significantly related to the offending behavior of 
the low morality individuals, as well. These findings may indicate the important role that 
morality plays in deviance, both as a protective and as a risk factor (Wikstrom, 2006), but 
one should also acknowledge that the low morality group does not contain many people
and power may therefore be an issue.  
 Thus, similar to peer reinforcement, the control variables have the most consistent 
effects on the medium morality group. In each of the models one of the bonding variables 
was significantly related to offending for the medium morality group. In the 19771978 
model, individuals who reported higher GPAs engaged in significantly fewer antisocial 
acts (b = -.144, p < .05), and in the 19781979 model individuals who reported stronger 
attachment to their family engaged in less delinquent acts for the medium morality 
individuals (b = -.203, p < .01). Being white is significantly related to offending for 
medium morality individuals in both the 19771978 (b = .437, p < .05) and the 
19781979 (b = .416, p < .01) models, suggesting that whites with medium levels of 




variables are significantly related to the offending behavior of individuals in the medium 
morality groups.12 
Chapter 5:  Discussion and Conclusion 
 
 
 Delinquent peers are one of the strongest predictors of antisocial beh vior 
(Anderson, 1999; Matsueda & Anderson, 1998; McGloin & Shermer, 2009; Shaw & 
McKay, 1931; Younts, 2008), and some scholars have even suggested that they are t  
most influential and important cause of delinquency (Warr, 2002). Still, like other risk 
factors for offending (i.e., sanction threats), individuals may be diffrentially vulnerable 
to the influence peers have on offending. To be sure, some individuals may be 
particularly susceptible to their peers in a way that much of teir deviance is contingent 
on the approval that their friends display towards antisocial behavior. Other individuals, 
however, may offend whether peers reinforce the behavior or not, or they may possess 
individual characteristics that protect them from the adverse effects of peer influence. Put 
simply, the influence that peers have on offending may not be uniform across all 
individuals, but instead could be moderated by individual characteristics in meaningful 
ways. 
                                                
12 An alternative explanation is that the models testing these relationships lack the sample size and 
statistical power to identify the effects. The issue of statistical power may be particularly problematic in the 
19771978 model, given the small sample size, however, it is less of an issue in the 19781979 model 
given the n = 85. Still, to test the power issue, th  low morality group is extended to include any 
respondents who possess an average morality score of less than three, which increases the sample size (and 
the statistical power) for the models. The results from these models, presented in Appendices 9 and 10, 
indicate that peer reinforcement is a statistically significant predictor of deviant behavior. This could be a 
result of increased statistical power, or it could be caused by the supplementary models now including 
individuals who do not actually possess low morality, and are instead capturing “middle ground” 
individuals as described above. Caution should be tak n before concluding that peers do not matter for low 




 In this thesis, it was hypothesized that learning mechanisms—specifically peer 
reinforcement—would only influence the offending behavior of individuals who are in 
the middle-ground of antisocial propensity. The rationale behind this hypothesis is that 
for individuals who are high in morality or possess low levels of morality, peer 
reinforcement is either insufficient or unnecessary to facilitte offending. The results of 
the analysis are inconclusive with regard to this hypothesis. As hypothesized, peer 
reinforcement did not have a statistically significant relationship with the offending of 
individuals of high morality. This suggests that peer reinforcement is inadequate to 
remove these individuals’ moral restraints against crime, and further may indicate that the 
behavior of these individuals is guided largely by their high levels of moral regard.  
Nevertheless, the results of an equality of coefficients test indicates that the slopes were 
not significantly different from the other morality groups, which raises important 
questions. 
  Peer reinforcement shows consistent effects on the deviant behavior of 
individuals in the middle ground of morality. Nagin and Paternoster (1994) have 
described these individuals as being neither strongly committed to crime nor 
unwaveringly conformist (p. 471), and thus are susceptible to social influences of crime. 
In other words, these individuals are at a “tipping point” (Granovetter, 1978) for 
offending, and their behavior is highly contingent on the anticipated and actual rewards 
peers provide for engaging in antisocial behavior. Indeed, the results of this study support 
this, finding strong and significant effects of peer reinforcement on delinquency for 




 The results regarding the role of peer reinforcement on the devianc  of low 
morality individuals were inconsistent. The finding that the relationship between peer 
reinforcement and offending was weak and non-significant in one model, but strong and 
significant in the other raises important questions regarding the rol  that peer 
reinforcement plays in the offending behavior of low morality individuals, nd high 
propensity offenders, more generally. A key thesis presented her, as well as in other 
prominent theories (Moffitt, 1993), is that particularly crime prone individuals do not 
require normative peer influence to offend. The attempts to address this issue did not 
yield any conclusive results—we cannot say with any certainty that peer reinforcement 
does or does not play a meaningful role in the offending decision of high propensity 
offenders. Whether the observed relationships here are a result of the sample and 
relatively liberal categorization of low morality offenders, or the use of morality as a 
measure of propensity remains unclear, and future research should seek to clarify the 
relationship further. 
 Nevertheless, these results and theoretical framework have several implications. 
First, the results suggest that delinquent peers, one of the most robusisk factors in 
offending for adolescents (Warr, 2002), may potentially not matter for eve yone. Akers 
(1998) and other learning theorists have highlighted the important socializing role peers 
play in promoting antisocial behavior, and have suggested that differential reinforcement 
is the primary cause of delinquency, particularly during adolescence (Akers, 1998; Warr, 
2002). The findings in this study, however, may suggest that peers may only play a strong 
and consistent role in offending for some individuals. Of course, the results of this study 




on the question of differential vulnerability to peer reinforcement. Ideed, given the 
salient role peers play in promoting antisocial behavior, there is a need for criminologists 
to replicate this study and assess not whether peers matter, but whether they matter 
differently for different people. 
 When assessing this idea of differential vulnerability, it may prove useful to 
utilize measures of morality that capture the complexity of indiv dual beliefs. To be clear, 
the individual morality measures used in this study were four-point Likert scales, and 
thus, did not allow for much variability across individuals. It is difficult to gather an 
accurate assessment of an individual’s true attitudes toward deviant behavior when 
limiting the responses to four concrete options. Although this study moved beyond 
simple dichotomies of propensity, it is likely that the level of antisocial propensity is 
more nuanced than presented in the current study. Indeed, the inability to more accurately 
distinguish individuals’ moral beliefs towards deviant behavior may be at l ast partially 
responsible for the inconsistencies found in this study. Further, while using morality as a 
measure of antisocial propensity made theoretical sense given the hypotheses of Matza 
and Warr, other forms of propensity may interact differently with peer reinforcement, and 
should be examined before reaching firm conclusions on how peer reinforcment affects 
individuals of varying antisocial propensities (e.g., neuropsychological deficits, self-
control). 
 Criminologists should also recognize some potential complications when testing 
the idea of differential vulnerability to peer influence. First, while the sample used here 
was restricted to individuals who remained juveniles throughout all three waves of the 




younger children at an earlier stage of the developmental process. The relative 
importance that individuals place on certain institutions (e.g., parents, schools, peers, 
marriage) changes over the life-course, and the strength that eac of these institutions has 
on an individual’s behavior may depend on the location in the developmental process 
(Sampson & Laub, 1993; Thornberry, 1987). Moreover, as mentioned above, there are 
most likely reciprocal effects in the relationships between peers, morality and deviance. 
For instance, while the current study indicates that morality conditi s the effects of 
peers, previous research has also suggested that peers can shape one’s moral beliefs 
(Thornberry et al., 1994). In this way, peers and morality interact su h that peers can 
shape one’s moral regard and one’s morality can moderate peer influence. Some 
criminological theories allow for such interactional effects (see Thornberry, 1987), and 
researchers are encouraged to more carefully examine these dynamic relationships in the 
future. 
 Second, there are numerous mechanisms by which peers can influence behavior, 
many of which are qualitatively different from peer reinforcement. Indeed, one caveat of 
the current analysis is that it focused exclusively on peer reinfo cement. Although the 
social learning perspective has placed a particularly strong emphasis on reinforcement 
contingencies in explaining criminal behavior, there are numerous other mechanisms by 
which peers can influence offending. Thus, in the grand scheme, peers may in fact 
“matter” for everyone, but why they matter may differ across individuals (McGloin & 
Stickle, 2011). In other words, peers may hold influence over the offending behavior of 
individuals of high or low propensity through mechanisms other than peer reinforcement. 




effect on individuals with the highest level of criminal propensity, not because they are 
susceptible to the learning mechanisms of peer influence, but ratherbecause they take 
advantage of the criminal opportunities that delinquent peers provide (see also Osgood et 
al., 1996). In this way, the individuals are differentially vulnerable to the particular 
mechanisms of peer influence, whereby those who are most vulnerable to criminal 
opportunities differ from those who are most susceptible to peer socialization (McGloin 
& Stickle, 2011). 
 The idea of differential vulnerability based on propensity and peer m chanism(s) 
also offers insight into the role that peer reinforcement plays in offending. Social learning 
theory has had to confront an empirical literature finding mixed and oftentimes weak 
effects for peer reinforcement. Pratt and colleagues’ (2010) recent m ta-analysis found 
that reinforcement had a relatively small effect on offending when compared to other 
social learning variables, suggesting that peer reinforcement ay only play a minor role 
in promoting antisocial behavior (see also Warr & Stafford, 1991). The assumption of 
uniform susceptibility to peer reinforcement may have undermined the impact that it has 
on offending, and a closer examination of those who are vulnerable to peer reinforcement 
should precede an outright dismissal of peer reinforcement as an important variable in 
offending. Indeed, it may be that peer reinforcement does play an important role in 
promoting delinquency, but the strength of that effect varies based on individual 
propensity towards offending. 
 Future researchers are encouraged to address these concerns and to add more 
clarity to the peer-propensity interaction. First, by testing whether the differential 




when using children and adult samples. Researchers should also determin  if peer 
reinforcement interacts with other forms of propensity in similar w ys. For instance, self-
control is one of the strongest predictors of offending (Pratt & Cullen, 2000). Although 
one might assume that peer reinforcement has its strongest effcts on those with medium 
levels of self-control, the issue remains an empirical question that can shed further light 
on the relationship between peers and propensity. Third, future researchers are 
encouraged to examine how other peer mechanisms of influence, such as opportunities, 
affects the offending behavior of individuals of varying antisocial propensities. By 
explicating the particular mechanism of peer influence, researchers an shed considerable 
theoretical insight on the processes driving the peer-delinquency r lationship. Finally, 
given the findings in this study, there is a clear need for future res arch to add clarity to 
the relationship between normative peer influence and low morality individuals.  
 In the end, this study moved beyond simple assessments of whether p ers matter 
and inquired whether peers matter differently for different people. Individual 
characteristics (such as morality) and peers play an important etiological role in 
offending, but whether these individual characteristics moderate peer influence in 
meaningful ways has been relatively neglected. This relationship between peers and 
propensity become even more complicated when one considers McGloin and Stickle’s 
(2011) recent idea that individuals who are most vulnerable to the criminogenic 
opportunities that peers provide may differ from those who are susceptible to peer 
socialization effects. This highlights the importance of explicating qualitatively distinct 
mechanisms of peer influence when testing peer-propensity interactions. To that end, the 




understanding of peer influence and delinquency: susceptibility to peer reinforcement is 







Appendix 1. Descriptive Statistics for Deviant Behaviors (1978) 

















.342 1.118 0 12 




980 .039 .422 0 10 
Theft > $50 979 .051 .461 0 10 
 




979 .209 2.194 0 50 
Attack Others 980 .071 .471 0 7 
 




980 .164 1.004 0 20 
Hit Parent 
 
980 .104 .661 0 12 




980 2.660 9.838 0 200 
Get Drunk 
 










Appendix 2. Descriptive Statistics for Deviant Behaviors (1979) 

















.397 1.941 0 35 




938 .091 .914 0 25 
Theft > $50 938 .181 2.622 0 60 
 




938 .324 2.594 0 50 
Attach 
Others 
938 .241 3.533 0 104 
 




938 .162 .812 0 12 
Hit Parent 
 
938 3.657 1.189 0 30 




938 2.688 8.681 0 100 
Get Drunk 
 














Appendix 3. Negative Binomial. Lagged effects of peer reinforcement conditional on 
morality (1977-1978): Deviance Variety Score. 
 Low Morals Med. Morals 
 
High Morals 







            (.220) 
 
.546** 
           (.081) 
               .431 
              (.259) 
Family 
Attachment 
            -.041 
            (.470) 
 
           -.087 
           (.048) 
              .515* 
             (.239) 
Parental 
Influence 
            -.351 
            (.097) 
 
           -.032 
           (.044) 
             -.245 
              (.172) 
GPA 
 
            -.088 
            (.098) 
 
           -.230** 
           (.049) 
              -.124 
              (.180) 
Age             -.097 
            (.098) 
 
           -.037 
           (.036) 
             -.044 
             (.116) 
White              .044 
            (1.041) 
 
           .357**   
          (.102) 
              .166 
            (.329) 
Male             .503 
           (.167) 
 
           .282 
          (.080) 
             .395 
            (.271) 
Urban           - .015 
           (.211) 
 
           .115 
          (.090) 
             .241 
            (.321) 
Constant            2.113 
         (1.959) 
 
          .549 
         (.599) 
           -1.740 
          (1.996) 
ln α            -1.859 
          (.549) 
 
         -.624 
         (.118) 
           .076 
          (.327) 
          n = 51         n = 746             n = 145 








Appendix 4. Negative Binomial. Lagged effects of peer reinforcement conditional on morality 
(1978-1979): Deviance Variety Score. 
 Low Morals Med. Morals 
 
High Morals 







            (.239) 
 
.590** 
           (.090) 
               .388 
              (.346) 
Family 
Attachment 
            -.148 
            (.102) 
 
           -.099 
           (.053) 
              .195 
             (.267) 
Parental Influence              .137 
            (.099) 
 
            .006 
           (.044) 
               .016 
              (.163) 
GPA 
 
             .020 
            (.124) 
 
           -.006 
           (.051) 
               .048 
              (.203) 
Age             -.043 
            (.113) 
 
           -.058 
           (.039) 
             -.064 
             (.143) 
White              .031 
            (.314) 
 
           .176 
          (.109) 
            -.723 
            (.393) 
Male             .055 
           (.248) 
 
           .512** 
          (.088) 
             .315 
            (.328) 
Urban             .054 
           (.244) 
 
           .075 
          (.097) 
             .334 
            (.408) 
Constant            -.186 
         (2.193) 
 
          -.326 
         (.695) 
           -1.162 
          (2.695) 
ln α            -.576 
          (.241) 
 
         -.686 
         (.137) 
            .131 
           (.371) 
          n = 85         n = 617             n = 109 










Appendix 5. Negative Binomial. Lagged effects of morality on deviance 
(1977-1978).  
Variable b  S.E. 
Morality             -.067* .027 
Peer Reinforcement .844** .149 
Family Attachment             -.034 .078 
Parental Influence             -.145* .065 
GPA             -.093 .069 
Age             -.010 .058 
White              .648** .156 
Male .311** .120 
Urban              .241 .143 
Constant            2.192 1.385 
   















Appendix 6. Negative Binomial. Lagged effects of morality on deviance 
(1978-1979).  
Variable b  S.E. 
Morality             -.132** .025 
Peer Reinforcement .642** .162 
Family Attachment             -.439** .083 
Parental Influence             -.119 .072 
GPA              .072 .081 
Age             -.135* .058 
White              .019 .175 
Male              .162 .147 
Urban              .149 .158 
Constant            7.800** 1.385 
   







Appendix 7. Correlation Matrix for 1977-1978 Analytic Sample   
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10. 
1. Deviance 
 




.379 --         
3. Morality 
 








-.127 -.199 .252 .369 --      
6. GPA 
 
-.172 -.190 .148 .108 .119 --     
7. Age 
 
.136 .248 -.295 -.081 -.014 -.049 --    
8. White 
 
.090 -.030 -.011 -.058 -.083 .043 -.023 --   
9. Male 
 
.162 .217 -.163 -.036 .045 -.185 .048 -.011 --  
10. Urban 
 











Appendix 8. Correlation Matrix for 1978-1979 Analytic Sample   
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10. 
1. Deviance 
 




.403 --         
3. Morality 
 








.028 -.069 -.017 .021 --      
6. GPA 
 
-.049 -.020 .020 .033 .185 --     
7. Age 
 
.070 .136 -.173 -.100 .039 .024 --    
8. White 
 
.100 -.022 -.124 -.109 -.033 .048 -.012 --   
9. Male 
 
.135 .240 -.142 .031 .031 -.002 .056 -.010 --  
10. Urban 
 





Appendix 9. Negative Binomial. Lagged effects of peer reinforcement conditional on morality 
(1977-1978): Cut-point at less than 3 for low morality group. 
 Low Morals Med. Morals 
 
High Morals 







            (.236) 
 
.525** 
           (.122) 
               .572 
              (.469) 
Family 
Attachment 
            -.040 
            (.101) 
 
           -.130 
           (.068) 
             -.759 
             (.401) 
Parental Influence              .014 
            (.090) 
 
           -.020 
           (.062) 
             -.535 
              (.342) 
GPA 
 
            -.211 
            (.116) 
 
           -.134* 
           (.068) 
              -.254 
              (.311) 
Age             -.107 
            (.143) 
 
            .046 
           (.051) 
             -.043 
             (.184) 
White              .164 
            (.237) 
 
           .471**   
          (.145) 
              .354 
            (.532) 
Male             .632** 
           (.236) 
 
           .193 
          (.113) 
             .502 
            (.457) 
Urban            -.188 
           (.220) 
 
           .205 
          (.133) 
            -.404 
            (.513) 
Constant            2.223 
         (1.923) 
 
          .216 
         (.845) 
           -2.203 
          (1.216) 
ln α             -.576 
           (.200) 
 
          .643 
         (.066) 
           1.505 
          (.170) 
          n = 81         n = 716             n = 145 










Appendix 10. Negative Binomial. Lagged effects of peer reinforcement conditional on 
morality (1978-1979): Cut-point at less than 3 for low morality group. 
 Low Morals Med. Morals 
 
High Morals 






  .723** 
            (.233) 
 
.693** 
           (.134) 
               .550 
              (.596) 
Family 
Attachment 
            -.121 
            (.110) 
 
           -.195* 
           (.080) 
              .198 
             (.374) 
Parental Influence              .190 
            (.010) 
 
           -.015 
           (.062) 
             -.301 
              (.210) 
GPA 
 
            -.067 
            (.127) 
 
           -.118 
           (.076) 
              -.081 
              (.293) 
Age             -.117 
            (.110) 
 
           -.040 
           (.054) 
              .223 
             (.180) 
White              .248 
            (.331) 
 
           .392**   
          (.148) 
            -1.044 
            (.679) 
Male             -.053 
            (.229) 
 
           .308 
          (.126) 
             .339 
            (.500) 
Urban            -.070 
           (.258) 
 
           .060 
          (.138) 
             .675 
            (.740) 
Constant           1.333 
         (1.933) 
 
         -.105 
          (.970) 
           -3.533 
          (3.784) 
ln α              .132 
           (.146) 
 
          .328  
         (.074) 
           1.307 
          (.217) 
          n = 126         n = 576             n = 109 
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